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FINANCIAL CONGENERICS AND
ANTITRUST POLICY
WM. PAUL SMITH*
INTRODUCTION
Although far from new, the one-bank holding company (OBHC) move-
ment gained public attention about two years ago.1 Since then, both the
OBHC movement and the attention given it -by bankers, bank regulatory
officials, members of potentially affected industries, and Congress, as well as
the public at large - have accelerated. The motivation for, the eventual
extent and consequences of, and appropriate public policies toward OBHCs
are of professed concern.
The one-bank holding company movement and the discussion surround-
ing it may be separated into two facets: (1) the acquisition and control of
banks by non-banking organizations; and (2) the bank initiated OBHCs -
the "financial congenerics" whose operations are confined to banking and
markets closely related to banking.2 Where the organization is primarily
non-banking, the one-bank holding companies fall into the "conglomerate"
category, thereby posing many analytical as well as policy problems not
encountered in a treatment of financial congenerics. The former are most
numerous and, admittedly, pose a number of questions of possible public
policy import. 3 Notwithstanding, the present paper's scope is limited to the
* Senior Economist, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency. A.B., Drury College,
1956; Ph.D., Northwestern University, 1966. The views expressed do not necessarily
represent those of the Comptroller of the Currency.
1 The more ancient vintage of one-bank holding companies is documented by Hall,
Some Impacts of One-Bank Holding Companies, in FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CHICAGO,
PROCEEDINGS OF A CONFERENCE ON BANK STRUCTURE AND COMPETITION, MAY 19 AND 20, 1969,
at 74-76 passim (1969), relying upon Robert J. Lawrence, The Nature of One-Bank Holding
Companies (unpublished paper in Banking Markets Section, Bd. of Governors of the Fed.
Reserve System).
2 Frequently these facets of the OBHC movement are not distinguished. As a result,
much of the data, as well as public debate, are misleading in that large industrial com-
plexes controlling relatively small banks are aggregated with large banks which are sub-
sidiaries of holding companies with few or no nonbank subsidiaries. See HOUSE COMM.
ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, THE GRowTH OF UNREGISTERED BANK HOLDING COMPANIES-
PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 115 CONG: REGC. 10,545 (daily ed. Nov. 5,
1969).
3The impact on banking markets of the "'conglomerate' one-bank holding com-
panies" might be considered in the same manner as the financial congenerics' impact on
"nonbanking" financial markets is treated in this paper. However, the "'conglomerate'
one-bank holding companies" may pose an additional issue of political philosophy -that
of the overall concentration of economic power within the economy. In my view, the
available data suggest that this cannot be properly ascribed to the financial congenerics.
Thus, the approach to public policies towards financial congenerics outlined in the present
paper might be properly subordinated to that issue of political philosophy insofar as
application to "'conglomerate' one-bank holding companies" is concerned.
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bases for "antitrust"-type policy towards financial congenerics.4 Further-
more, the latent jurisdictional problems of the complementary and com-
petitive roles of the various banking agencies and the Department of Justice
in implementing the proposed criteria are ignored.5
The present discussion reflects the author's views concerning the ap-
propriate goals of antitrust policy and enforcement and of commercial bank
regulation. Both should be directed toward influencing industry structure
and operating environment so that the resulting rivalry among firms will
lead to the establishment of prices, outputs, product specifications, and allied
economic variables which serve to maximize social welfare as viewed by
final consumers (not producers). The preponderance of bank regulation
which is designed to protect bank customers from the losses and disruptions
of bank failures and not to protect management and stockholders from
rivalry or their own incompetence suggests that I do not stand alone. These
views are not the only ones possible nor, indeed, necessarily always shared
by those in a position to make policy decisions. My reading of the congres-
sional hearings and debate on the one-bank holding company bill, for ex-
ample, suggests that many congressmen and witnesses were more con-
4 Although antitrust policy towards financial congenerics is an issue of considerable
consequence, it is overshadowed by other public policy issues relating to the proper scope
of the operations of financial congenerics, i.e., of banks and bank related enterprises.
However, once the larger issues concerning the limits on the scope and extent of banks',
or of financial congenerics', operations in markets generically related to banking have
been established, "antitrust"-type policy issues will be of major significance.
5 In language closely paralleling section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964),
and section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964), the Bank Merger Act of 1966, 12
U.S.C. § 1828(c) (Supp. IV, 1968), and the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, 12 U.S.C.
§ 1842(c) (Supp. IV, 1968) provide that the responsible banking agency must consider
"antitrust"-type issues in passing on applications for bank acquisitions. Somewhat less
explicitly, H.R. 6778, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969), as reported by the House Banking and
Currency Committee would involve a similar mandate to the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System which "may take into consideration whether entry is to be on a
de novo basis or by acquisition of an existing company" in its approval of a bank holding
company's application to acquire
any company performing any activity that the Board has determined . . . is func-
tionally related to banking in such a way that its performance by an affiliate of a
bank holding company can reasonably be expected to produce benefits to the
public that outweigh possible adverse effects.
The greatly amended version of H.R. 6778, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969), passed by the House
provides that "the Board may differentiate between activities commenced de novo and
activities commenced by the acquisition, in whole, or in part, of a going concern" in its
approved of carrying on an activity by a particular company or generally in the case of
regulation
if the Board finds ... that the carrying on of the activity in question . will be
functionally related to banking and can reasonably be expected to produce bene-
fits to the public, such as greater convenience, increased competition, or gains in
efficiency, that outweigh possible adverse effects such as undue concentration of
economic resources, decreased or unfair competition, conflicts of interest, or un-
sound banking practices.
115 CONG. REC. 10,559 (daily ed. Nov. 5, 1969). The antitrust nature of this language is
explicitly acknowledged in an exchange between Congressman Celler, Chairman of the
House Judiciary Committee, and Congressman Moorhead, sponsor of the instant amend-
ment to H.R. 6778. 115 CONG. REC. 10,561 (daily ed. Nov. 5, 1969).
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cerned with sheltering firms from the rigors of competition with financial
congenerics.
Subsequent sections of this paper consider: (1) the definition and charac-
teristics of financial congenerics along with the motivations underlying the
financial congeneric movement; (2) the available evidence concerning the
scope and consequences of financial congenerics' entry into related markets;
and (3) the rationale and guidelines for antitrust policy with respect to
financial congenerics' entry into related markets by merger. The proposed
guidelines, which are behavioral in nature, are developed in the context of
financial conegerics' entry into laterally related markets by merger.6
THE NATURE OF FINANCIAL CONGENERICS
"Financial congenerics," as the term is used here, consist of bank in-
itiated one-bank holding companies whose "nonbanking" (in the traditional
sense) interests are confined to markets that are related to banking by joint-
ness of production, jointness of demand, and similar or parallel managerial
and market functions. 7 The markets that financial congenerics have entered,
or have expressed an intent to enter, largely have been financial ones. Where
non-financial markets were involved, they also were related to banking in
the same manner.8 Frequently, as with data processing services, for example,
the banks involved also were attempting to utilize excess capacity.9
6 Entry into vertically related markets and entry into markets related to banking by
jointness of consumption both pose analytical problems, occasionally elaborate ones, that
are not investigated in the present article. Some facets of the argument might have to be
modified in order to fully account for the problems raised by entry into such markets.
However, without a full treatment of the problems, which would be both lengthy and
intricate, we cannot be confident that the modifications are other than ambiguous. For
example, vertical integration through monopoloid markets- assuming profit maximizing
behavior -would ceteris paribus lead to lower "downstream" prices; but, under the
severe assumptions that all firms in a market are affiliated with banks and that all or
most banks are so affiliated, independent entry into that market may require internal
credit sources and a fortiori the greater barriers to entry would lead to higher prices. The
net results of such countervailing developments are not obvious, depending, inter alia,
upon the nature of the cost functions in each industry, optimum firm scale, credit require-
ments of the firm, relative size of the markets involved, and demand elasticities.
7 As we are concerned with a general outline of the appropriate antitrust policy
towards financial congenerics, specific delineation of "banking," "nonbanking," "financial,"
"nonfinancial," and "related" markets is not crucial to the argument. The specific limits
of "bank" and, in turn, "nonbanking," for example, have never been delineated, nor does
it seem either possible or desirable to do so. Illustrative of the ambiguity is a list of
"nonbank activities engaged in by 1-bank holding companies formed on or after Jan. 1,
1965," 115 CONG. REa. 9,779 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 1969), listing long standing commercial bank
activities of agricultural lending, commercial loans, factoring, and loans to insurance
companies, and long standing commercial bank trust department activities of fiduciary
accounts, escrow services, and pension fund trustees.
s For the most part, the financial and nonfinancial product or service markets thus
far entered by the financial congenerics- data processing, equipment leasing, factoring,
mortgage servicing, etc.-are ones that some banks had previously operated in under the
"incidental powers" provision of the National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 24, Seventh (Supp.
1970). Thus, the financial congeneric movement might be more aptly labelled a legal book-
keeping phenomenon rather than a functional change in financial institutions.
9 In this particular case, the excess capacity stems from both the fact that the banks'
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The commercial banking industry has a unique history and, in ad-
dition, is enshrouded in highly restrictive legislation as well as the confining
regulatory and judicial interpretation of that legislation. Were it not for
this history, legislation and interpretation of the legislation, it is likely that
the economic evolution represented by the financial congeneric movement
not only would have been long completed, but would have drawn little
public notice. The diversification process by firms in other non-financial
industries certainly has not excited the same sort of intense interest. But,
despite the myriad changes in financial markets and in the overall function-
ing of the economy over the past four decades, the prevailing banking
legislation and the interpretation of that legislation still are based largely
on responses to developments during the Great Depression. 10
The financial congeneric movement constitutes an extension of banks'
responses to the changes in their environment, given the legislative and
regulatory restraints imposed upon banks. The Glass-Steagall Act severely
circumscribes the ability of banks-but not that of organizations con-
trolling a single bank -to enter related markets.1 As a result, banks have
internal requirements were not sufficient to fully utilize their own facilities - the size
of which was circumscribed by technological indivisibilities - and the concentration of
internal requirements during the banks' normal business hours, leaving the data pro-
cessing installation underutilized at other times. A "laundry list" amendment to H.R,
6778 introduced by Congressman Blackburn prohibits "bank holding companies or sub-
sidiaries thereof" from, inter alia,
[elngaging in the business of providing data processing services except (A) as
an incident to banking services such as the preparation of payrolls, or (B) to the
extent necessary to make economical use of equipment primarily acquired and
used for the bank holding company or its bank subsidiaries.
115 CONG. Rrc. 10.553 (daily ed. Nov. 5, 1969).
It may be noted that the legal status of the offering of data processing services by
banks, in contrast to financial congenerics, under the above mentioned "incidental
powers" provision of the National Bank Act is presently being challenged by the Associa-
tion of Data Processing Service Organizations and member organizations, See Wingate
Corp. v. Industrial Nat'l Bank, 288 F. Supp. 49 (D.R.I. 1968); Association of Data Process-
ing Serv. Organ., Inc. v. Camp, 279 F. Supp. 675 (D. Minn. 1968), aff'd, 406 F.2d 837 (8th
Cir.), cert. granted, 395 US. 976 (1969).
10The Banking Act of 1933 (Glass-Steagall Act), 12 U.S.C. § 378(a) (1964), and the
Banking Act of 1935, 12 U.S.C. § 371 (1964),- enacted in response to the economic chaos
then prevailing- were designed, inter alia, to restrict the scope of the operations of
commercial banks. The popular, somewhat incorrect, belief then (as now) was that banks'
involvement in activities other than "commercial banking" was responsible for the wide-
spread bank failures of the late 1920's and early 1930's. This belief ignores the effect of
the overall collapse in 1929 of the economy upon individual banks and the banking
system. The persistence of the sentiment underlying the banking legislation of the 1930's
as a rationale for current public policies toward the scope of commercial bank operations
ignores pari passu the Employment Act of 1946, 15 U.S.C. § 1021 (1964), and the efficacy
of modern tools of monetary and fiscal policy.
11 With certain exceptions, corporations controlling two or more banks are subject to
the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, 12 U.S.C.-§ 1841 (1964). Under this law, the
ownership of non-bank subsidiaries by registered bank holding companies is limited to
any company all the activities of which are or are to be of a financial, fiduciary,
or insurance nature and which the Board ...by order has determined to be so
closely related to the business of banking or of managing or controlling banks
as to be a proper incident thereto ....
Id. § 1843(c)(8) (Supp. IV, 1968). The standards to be applied under H.R. 6778 as
FINANCIAL CONGENERICS
initiated the formation of holding companies to control the initiating bank
and to control other subsidiaries which would operate in related markets.
The environment in which banks operate has changed markedly over
the past few years. In large part, the motivation for banks to enter the re-
lated markets, and in turn for the financial congenerics movement, stems
from the changes in environment. Banks have been subjected to increasingly
intense inter-bank and non-bank competition in the markets in which they
have traditionally operated. 12 The development of the commercial paper
market, for example, has signified increased competition for commercial
banks in both factor (deposit) and product (loan) markets. To some extent,
commercial banks have been able to compensate for non-bank competition
by developing new product lines or new financial instruments, e.g., the large
denomination Certificates of Deposit and bank credit cards.
Increased competition has meant an erosion of the individual and col-
lective market positions of banks, i.e., whatever monopoly power banks once
may have had is declining. By contrast, firms operating in a number of
markets that banks have sought to enter - e.g., insurance sales - are highly
sheltered from many forms of rivalry within the market and from com-
petition from other product lines due to the nature of the product in-
volved.' 3 Thus, rather than attempting to extend their monopoly power,
banks, via the financial congenerics vehicle, are attempting to enter less
intensely competitive markets. 14
reported by the House Banking and Currency Committee were intended to be less con-
stricting. Although the standards to be applied by the Board in passing on activities not
on the prohibited "laundry list" in the House-passed version of H.R. 6778 closely parallel
those in the Committee version of the bill, it is not entirely clear that the intent to be
less constricting was retained. See HOUSE COMM. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, BANK HOLDING
COMPANIES, H.R. REP. No. 387, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 14-16 (1969); 115 CONG. REC. 10,560
(daily ed. Nov. 5, 1969); note 5 supra.
12 The earlier efforts of banks to capture a portion of the burgeoning consumer credit
market in the 1940's and of both the residential mortgage and savings deposits markets
in the 1950's demonstrate that the development is neither new nor dependent upon tight
money. See D. Alhadeff & C. Alhadeff, The Struggle for Commercial Bank Savings, 72
Q.J. EcoN. 1 (1958).
13 It may be noted that both the Committee and House-passed version of H.R. 6778
would prohibit bank holding companies from acting as insurance agents, except for credit
life insurance. In the Committee version, a "grandfather clause" would exempt companies
"lawfully acquired and owned on February 17, 1969," but the House passed version
provides a cut-off date of May 9, 1956, and would require divestiture by an earlier formed
"one bank holding company with bank assets of more than $30,000,000 and non-bank
assets of more than $10,000,000." As the Board has approved the acquisition of insurance
agencies by registered bank holding companies, H.R. 6778 would restrict the scope of
operations by multi-bank holding companies. H.R. REP. No. 91-387, 91st Cong., 1st Sess.,
9-10, 15-16 (1969); 115 CONG. REG. 10,545-53, 10,566 (daily ed. Nov. 5, 1969).
14 The problem of tie-in sales has been raised in connection with the possibility that
banks might package services. It has been shown many times that tie-in sales are effective
for the firm only where the firm is able to charge an above competitive price for the tied
product. Thus, some critics may be right in suggesting that there is a potential problem
here, but their identification of the basis for that problem is at the very least badly
confused. See Bowman, Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67 YALE L.J. 19-36
(1957); Burstein, The Economics of Tie-In Sales, 42 REv. ECON. & STAT. 68 (1960).
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CONSEQUENCES OF CONGENERICS ENTRY INTO RELATED MARKETS
The extent of commercial banks', and of financial congenerics' oper-
ations in traditionally "non-banking" markets is not fully documented.15
Nonetheless, it is clear that the scope of bank, and of financial congeneric
operations has been steadily expanding in the past few years.' 6 Indeed, for
some time, virtually every issue of The American Banker, the daily trade
paper for the industry, has contained some reference to a contemplated, in
process, or consummated expansion of financial congenerics into traditional
"non-banking" areas.' 7 As yet, no one has ventured a serious, carefully
reasoned forecast as to the ultimate extent of banks and of financial con-
generics operations in traditional "non-banking" markets.
Comparatively little is known of the performance effect of bank or
financial congeneric entry into related markets. Indeed, in only one case
has serious study been devoted to the potential impact of commercial bank
entry into a related market - municipal revenue bond underwriting. Three
independent studies have been devoted to a quantification of the savings to
public authorities that would result from commercial bank entry into
municipal revenue bond underwriting.'8 While the data employed and the
variables utilized in the analysis differed, each study found that commercial
bank entry into revenue bond underwriting would have a statistically sig-
nificant and, I think, a quantitatively appreciable impact upon the interest
costs of municipal revenue bond financing.
The studies of the potential impact of commercial bank entry into
revenue bond underwriting are suggestive of the potential benefits of bank,
and of financial congeneric, entry into related markets. But these studies do
not necessarily indicate the form of the benefits stemming from entry into
other markets. Whereas market performance in municipal bond under-
writing has but one dimension,19 in most markets that commercial banks
are attempting to enter performance is multi-dimensional. Moreover, in
many cases the performance variables which may be affected by the firms'
15 Considerable data, however, are presented in, inter alia, THE GROWTH OF UN-
REGISTERED BANK HOLDING COMPANIES- PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS, supra note 2, and HOUSE
COMM. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, BANK HOLDING COMPANY ACT AMENDMENTS, 91st Cong.,
1st Sess. (3 vols. 1969). See also Hall, supra note 1.
16 See Hall, supra note 1.
17 In most cases, of course, the product line or service was not a novel one for corn-
inercial banks or for financial congenerics, albeit an extension of the particular organiza-
tion's products or services. See note 8 supra and accompanying text.
18 W. SMITH, COMMERCIAL BANK ENTRY INTO REVENUE BOND UNDERWRITING: COMPETI-
fIVE IMPACT & PUBLIC BENEFITS (1968); Keir & Kichline, Interest Cost Effects of Com-
mercial Bank Underwriting of Municipal Revenue Bonds, 53 FED. RESERVE BULL. 1287-1302
(1967); Kessel, The Economic Consequences of the Exclusion of Bank Competition from
the Underwriting of Revenue Bonds, in SENATE COMM. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, BANK
UNDERWRITING OP REVENUE BONDS, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 192-204 (1967).
19 It may be noted that the most common formulation of market performance in
municipal bond underwriting markets, net interest cost, is not an unambiguous measure
of the burden of interest payments over the life of new municipal debt such as would
be given by a discounted present value calculation. See W. SMITH, supra note 18, at 45-47.
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behavior are of a service, non-quantifiable nature. Insurance premiums, for
example, typically are established by a state authority, and, in such markets,
the dimensions of performance under control of the individual firms and
perhaps of the market as a whole are of the service nature.20 In other in-
dustries one may very well find changes which would normally be regarded
as improvements in the product or service associated perhaps with increases
in rates. Hence, where market performance is multi-dimensional it is most
difficult to appraise by quantitative methods the welfare effects of changes
in the market and in the firms that operate in the market.21
The available evidence suggests that bank entry into related markets
will have a favorable impact upon the performance of those related mar-
kets; however, since the direct evidence on performance relates to a market
in which performance is uni-dimensional, it is only suggestive. Further, the
available evidence relates to de novo entry rather than the acquisition of
firms in nominally distinct markets, the focus of antitrust policy with respect
to financial congenerics. Nonetheless, the limited number of antitrust cases
involving even vaguely analogous situations forces one to conclude that
present antitrust statutes, as clarified by case law, provide a less adequate
base for charting the appropriate contours of antitrust policy towards finan-
cial congenerics.
ENTRY INTO RELATED MARKETS BY MERGER
A financial congeneric's entry into a new market via merger does not
affect the usual measures of that market's structure.2 2 Nonetheless, financial
congenerics' entry into new markets can be expected to affect the socio-
2OAn exception perhaps to the above statement that in only one instance has serious
study been devoted to the potential impact of commercial bank entry into a related
market, is an August 1, 1969, report. NATIONAL AsS'N OF INS. AGENTS, THE POSSIBLE IMPACT
ON COMPETITION OF BANK ENTRY INTO THE INSURANCE AGENCY BUSINESS: NORTH CAROLINA
-THE ECONOMISTS REPORT (1969). This Report is referred to in the "Summary and Con-
clusions" of an "investigation" by lawyers for the NAIA placed in 115 CONG. Rc. 10,568-
73 (daily ed. Nov. 5, 1969), by Congressman Patman. As summarized, it appears that the
authors of the Report failed to acknowledge the essential dynamics of market structure
where resale price maintenance with free entry prevails. Accordingly, the authors' con-
clusions may well be invalid.
21 An analysis of the impact of financial congenerics' entry into most markets also
would pose problems in quantifying market structure and changes in it. See Rosenbluth,
Measures of Concentration, in BUSINESS CONCENTRATION AND PRICE POLICY 57-95 (Am.
Econ. Ass'n, 1955); W. Smith, Measures of Banking Structure and Competition, 51 FED.
RESERVE BULL. 1212-22 (1965).
22 An exception perhaps is the "barriers to entry" -"potential competitor" dimen-
sion of market structure. Entry by acquisition does eliminate a potential entrant, a matter
of greater significance where the potential entrant is an established firm rather than a de
novo organization. Hence, entry by acquisition may affect the "barriers to entry" dimen-
sion of market structure, but, at best, both the direction and magnitude of that effect
are uncertain. Successful entry in itself allays some of the uncertainty for other potential
entrants as to the ease of entry; hence, the elimination of a potential entrant may have
the seemingly perverse effect of lowering the barriers to entry. See Hines, Effectiveness of
"Entry" by Already Established Firms, 71 Q.J. ECON. 132 (1957); Osborne, The Role of
Entry in Oligopoly Theory, 72 J. POL. ECON. 596 (1964).
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economic performance of those markets. The behavior of firms acquired by
financial congenerics is likely to be highly influenced by the banks even
where the acquired firms are large relative to the banks and to the markets
in which they operate.2 3 The changes in behavior of the acquired firms
would affect market performance directly and by influencing the forms and
nature of rivalry among all firms in the market. The relevant public policy
question, therefore, directly relates to the banks' impact on the acquired
firms' behavior as it affects the socio-economic performance of the market(s)
served by the acquiring firm.
Let us consider separately some "typical" cases, classified by the market
position of the acquired firms and the nature of the market(s) in which they
operate. The cases considered here each involve oligopolistic markets,
broadly defined. While not all markets that financial congenerics might
enter are oligopolistic, the analytical treatment developed here should en-
compass the other relevant market forms. 24 In addition, implicit in the
discussion is an assumption that the markets are laterally, not vertically,
related to commercial banking. The modifications of the analysis and policy
conclusions necessary to encompass financial congenerics' entry into ver-
tically integrated markets are considered in the subsequent section.
Dominant Firm
The acquired firm's position as "dominant firm" may stem from its
preponderant market share or from the unique dynamics of rivalry within
its market(s).25 This situation poses perhaps the least policy interest as well
as the greatest ambiguity of the cases to be considered. 26
23 Although taking diametrically opposite views concerning its significance, both
critics and defenders of the financial congeneric movement agree that the motivation for
OBHC's entry into allied financial markets stems from the profit opportunities of control
and operation, in contrast to simple stock investments.
24 For example, markets which might be labelled as monopoly or duopoly may
legitimately be grouped with the "dominant firm" case, while "competitive" and "monop-
olistically competitive" markets might, with only slight changes, be grouped with the
"fringe firm" case.
25 The use here of the expression "dominant firm" is intended to denote dominant,
not merely prominent. In terms of the impact of an acquisition upon a market's function-
ing and performance and, therefore, of appropriate public policy, the distinction is an
important one. Nonetheless, the cases often are not differentiated in the antitrust literature.
See, e.g., Campbell & Shepherd, Leading-Firm Conglomerate Mergers, 13 ANTITRUST BuLL.
1361 (1968).
A classic example of a "dominant firm" is the R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company, which
perhaps four decades following the dissolution of American Tobacco Company, estab-
lished the forms of rivalry within the cigarette industry. To be sure, Reynolds' unique,
and successful, behavior led to a market share of 45 percent in 1923. But it is Reynolds'
earlier behavior (the "Camel" revolution) and the impact of that behavior on the rest of
the market that make the firm a prototype of market leader, within the context of the
unique dynamics of rivalry within its markets that I wish to emphasize. See W. NICHOLLS,
PRICE POLICIES IN THE CIGARETTE INDUSTRY 35-72 passim (1951); R. TENNANT, THE AMERICAN
CIGARETTE INDUSTRY 70-110 passim (1950).
26 The profits - beyond, and in addition to, the return from simple stock investments
-to be realized from financial congenerics' acquisitions of other firms depend upon real
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The financial congeneric's acquisition of a "dominant firm" (in the
above senses) can be expected to affect the forms of rivalry of firms within
the market and a fortiori the total complex of socio-economic performance
variables.27 Unlike other cases to be considered, we are not able to derive
general propositions indicating that market performance would either im-
prove, or deteriorate, as a result of the financial congeneric's entry into a
market via acquisition of the dominant firm.2 8 One might expect an im-
provement in performance by some indices and a deterioration in perfor-
mance by other norms, with the necessity of weighing the former against the
latter in order to evaluate the net impact of the acquisition upon market
performance.
Such evaluation of necessity requires data generated by consummation
of the merger and some period of operation by the financial congenerics.
Even so, the requisite history would confront the appropriate authority with
knotty empirical and analytical difficulties of quantifying various dimensions
of market performance as well as the difficulties in establishing a weighting
schema for deriving the net effect on market performance. 29
There are perhaps two sufficient pragmatic reasons for an antitrust
program designed to forestall such acquisitions and in turn to avoid the
problems inherent in assessing the impact of the acquisition on market per-
formance. First, divestiture proceedings are socially costly and, even if
nominally successful, cannot be expected to reverse history fully; manage-
ment may have been shifted within the congeneric organization, some
managerial or other operating functions of the acquired firm may have
and pecuniary advantages reflecting, for example, joint production, enhancement of
demand, or vertical integration through a monopoloid market, as discussed below. There
is no reason to believe that the acquisitions of "dominant firms" per se provide exceptional
opportunities for augmenting profits vis-A-vis acquisitions of firms with less eminent
market positions. By contrast, the purchase prices for "dominant firms" will reflect the
value of the going concern either as a monopolist or as an aggressively managed firm
(for which there may be little opportunity for improving internal performance).
27 It is conceivable that in some cases the "facts" and nature of rivalry within the
market might be sufficiently similar to those in FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S.
568 (1967) (Clorox case) for this case to constitute a legal precedent for cases involving
financial congenerics' acquisitions of dominant firms. In most financial markets, however,
promotional efforts are a less crucial element of inter-firm rivalry, making Clorox, at best,
a debatable precedent for the treatment of financial congenerics under section 7 of the
Clayton Act, 15 US.C. § 18 (1964).
28 This is not to say that such general propositions cannot be derived for particular
markets or industries that commercial banks might enter. The entry of large commercial
banks into geographically distinct markets via merger, for an analogous case, has a
predictable impact upon rivalry and performance. Within commercial banking, feasible
behavior of the banks are constrained by size as it affects, inter alia, both the ability to
acquire, train and keep specialized management personnel, and the capacity of the bank,
e.g., lending limits to individual customers, and the proportion of total resources that
can be utilized to acquire risk assets. As a result, larger banks are "risk takers" compared
to smaller institutions in the same or geographically separate markets. The implications
of these relationships are well illustrated in the district court's opinion in United States
v. First Nat'l Bank, 301 F. Supp. 1161 (S.D. Miss. 1969).
29 As noted above, it may not be possible to quantify many of the relevant dimensions
of market performance. See note 19 supra and accompanying text.
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
consolidated with that of other firms within the system, etc., making the
reincarnation of the initially self-sufficient acquired firm impossible 5 Sec-
ond, and perhaps of greater significance, should the acquisition not enhance
market performance, an irretrievable loss in social welfare will have oc-
curred.31
Thus, an arbitrary rule for antitrust policy with respect to financial
congeneric expansion would be to bar acquisitions of dominant firms in the
senses outlined above. (This qualification, as the following section shows, is
of the utmost importance.) However, it should be recognized that forestalling
dominant firm acquisitions by financial congenerics in many cases would
involve relinquishing (potential) net gains in social welfare. Some consider-
ation can be given this possibility either by the Antitrust Division of the
Department of Justice's exercise of discretion in deciding whether to contest
a contemplated acquisition or by amending the antitrust laws to permit a
social welfare defense in contested cases.3 2 The first may be difficult, if
not impossible, to defend without a change in the law providing the
Department of Justice with a mandate to consider social welfare as distinct
from "restraint of trade," "substantially to lessen competition," and "tend
to create a monopoly" as now viewed. Precedent for the second is found in
the "convenience and needs" defense provided in the Bank Merger Act of
1966 and the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956.33
Core Firms
Financial congenerics' acquisitions of firms in related industries perhaps
are most likely to involve "core firms." "Core firms" consist of the few-
30 "Examining old relief decrees does not carry one to ebullient heights on the efficacy
of Section 7 relief." Elzinga, The Antitrust Law: Pyrrhic Victories, 12 J. LAw & ECON. 43,
74 (1969).
31 One might argue that operating under the Sword of Damocles of threatened divesti-
ture proceedings, the behavior of the acquired firm, and the resultant market performance,
would not be the same as would be the case later when the firm might believe that it
had survived some implicit statute of limitations. (Precisely this argument was made by
the NAIA. See note 20 supra.) As a result, those charged with evaluating market per-
formance for the purposes of possible initiation of divestiture proceedings would be
given eventually misleading data. While this may be a problem, I would be more con-
cerned about changes in the philosophical predilections, and a fortiori the weighting
schema, of the evaluators.
32 Both alternatives admittedly eliminate some of the element of "certainty" provided
by single valued criteria-market share "guidelines," for example- for deciding merger
cases.
33 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c) (Supp. IV, 1968); 12 U.S.C. § 1842(c) (Supp. IV, 1968). H.R. 6778
as passed by the House provides for an examination by the Federal Reserve Board of
offsetting public welfare considerations, in addition to competition, when the Board must
make a determination relative to bank holding companies' "non-banking" operations.
However, it is not expressly provided that the courts would employ the same criteria in
judicial review of, say, acquisitions of "non-bank" subsidiaries contested by the Antitrust
Division of the Department of Justice. In any event, that a social welfare argument such
as "convenience and needs" was provided by Congress as a defense against the (presump-
tion or) allegation of, and administrative or judicial determination of a lessening of
"competition," inextricably raises a question as to the purpose of the relevant "antitrust"
laws.
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none of which are "dominant firms" in the above senses- whose interac-
tions collectively establish the nature and forms of rivalry and in turn per-
formance within the market. Although of sufficient relative size to be of
consequence in its own primary market, these "core firms" typically have
only a limited scope of operations- i.e., a single or few product lines.34
Hence, the behavior of "core firms" to be acquired by financial congenerics
is largely conditioned by the firms' interests in a single market. As a financial
congeneric subsidiary, however, the firm's behavior in part would be con-
ditioned by the congeneric's operations in other markets, particularly com-
mercial banking. Furthermore, the requisite resources- financial, manage-
rial, etc. - for implementing changes in behavior would be more readily
available to (if not initially under the control of) the financial congeneric
subsidiary.35
Thus, the acquisition of the "core firm" again is likely to materially
affect the firm's behavior in the market(s) in which it operates. Although
price may be affected, the principal avenues of change are likely to be of a
"service" or product attribute nature. Depending on the market(s) involved,
the changes may be reflected in new terms, a tailoring of terms to meet
customer requirements, provision of services not previously provided as a
part of transactions (the acquired firm, for example, may be able to supply
services performed by other members of the financial congeneric complex),
etc.36 All such changes, of course, are designed to gain customers, but as they
also signify a preferable package to individual, and groups of customers,
such changes are not empty frills. The relevant policy question is whether
the resultant change in the nature and forms of rivalry within the market
can be expected to provide a socially preferable complex of socio-economic
performance variables.
The expanded total complex of socio-economic performance variables
in the market following the financial congeneric's entry into related markets
by merger would include the initial complex of performance variables.3 7
34 The latter attribute is not a definitional characteristic of "core firms," but, rather,
what seems to be an empirical property of the majority of firms in related markets acquired
by banks and by financial congenerics. For purposes of the present argument, it is
necessary only that the sphere of interests bearing on the firms' behavior of the resulting
complex be materially different from that of the acquired firms.
85 The point here is in direct conflict with the contention by Campbell and Shepherd
that
if a leading firm in a concentrated industry is acquired by a firm with significant
market power in another industry; this will probably . . . reduce the scope and
intensity of competitive activity, by increasing the leading firm's ability to threaten
or sustain competitive strategies.
Campbell & Shepherd, supra note 25, at 1371.
36 The significance of a more comprehensive package of services in particular is
bitterly contested by detractors of the financial congeneric movement who see this ability
of the financial congenerics in terms that range from "unfair advantage" to "illegal tie-in
sales" to "coercion." See 115 CONG. REC. 10,492-514 (daily ed. Nov. 4, 1969); 115 CONG.
REC. 10,544-75 (daily ed. Nov. 5, 1969); and, for a less polemical, and often favorable,
discourse, Hall supra note 1, at 83-88 passim.
87For purposes of discussion of the present case-financial congenerics' acquisitions
of "core firms"- it is a sufficient, but not necessary, assumption that (at least a substantial
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The entry of financial congenerics into related markets by acquisition of
"core firms" therefore must be viewed as socially desirable.
Before one can establish ,that antitrust policy should be totally per-
missive towards a financial congeneric's acquisition of "core firms," one must
consider whether there are preferable alternatives from a social welfare point
of view. s That is, would acquisitions of "fringe firms" by financial conge-
nerics have a more pronounced impact on market performance? In the next
section, the relative merits of acquisitions of "fringe firms" and de novo
entry are considered.
The effect of financial congenerics' acquisitions of "core firms" on
market performance may well be direct and immediate insofar as established
customers of the acquired firm are concerned.3 9 The effect of the acquisition
of a "core firm" would be felt throughout the market as other firms react to
the financial congeneric affiliated firm's changes in policies. How soon de-
pends upon the nature of changes in behavior by the financial congeneric
affiliated firm and the (perhaps new) dynamics of rivalry in the market. Un-
fortunately, while temporal magnitude of "sooner or later" is significant, it
is not possible to quantify the time involved, at least in a general case.40
portion of) the remaining "independent" "core firms" continue to be viable institutions,
i.e., that the financial congeneric not enjoy sufficient real (productive) or pecuniary ad.
vantages to immediately vanquish all firms from the market. However, it is sometimes
asserted that banks, or financial congenerics, would drive the independent out of the
market via some, generally unspecified, combination of competitive (or predatory) moves.
Then, so the argument goes, banks would extract their monopoly gain, leaving the public
"worse off." This is merely a resurrection of the long discredited recoupment argument.
See, e.g., Bork, Vertical Integration and the Sherman Act: The Legal History of an
Economic Misconception, 22 U. Cmi. L. REv. 157 (1954).
38 In recent bank merger cases, the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice
has contended that where a less "anticompetitive" solution is available -say, as an
alternative to a particular bank merger advanced to "solve" management problems -the
courts should bar the merger proposal at hand. The treatment of (1) the internal, usually
managerial, facets of bank mergers; (2) the "competitive" impact of bank mergers; and
(3) the "convenience and needs" benefits to the communities affected resulting from the
mergers, as separate and distinct phenomenon does not seem to me to be a legitimate
taxonomy. (Admittedly, the Bank Merger Act of 1960, 12 U.S.C. § 1828 (Supp. IV, 1968),
and the Bank Merger Act of 1966, amending 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c) (Supp. IV, 1968), appear
to dictate such separations, but the legislative record often suggests a confusion of, and a
less sharp demarcation of, these facets of bank mergers.) Management in part determines
the behavior of the firm and, in turn, the competitive impact of a merger. Moreover,
"convenience and needs," whatever else the term might denote, clearly has performance
dimensions that, in all models of markets, reflect an interaction of firms - be it called
competition, conduct, behavior or rivalry. Even the most naive models of markets rely
upon a behavioral assumption to derive the effect of structure upon performance. More-
over, it is only in the most naive model employing particular assumptions as to cost
functions, to demand functions, to behavior of one and all firms, that there is a unique
connection between market structure and performance. Regrettably, it is this model that
underlies the Antitrust Division's approach to, especially, bank merger cases.
39 Ordinarily there would be some inertia in policy during a transition period follow-
ing the acquisition and perhaps a short delay in the initiation of major changes in policy.
In any event, not all eventual policy changes would be made immediately, as the congeneric
affiliated firm would react to the changes in behavior of other firms as the latter responded
to the changes initiated by the former.
40 Among the many relevant considerations are: (1) the time period covered by
individual transactions, e.g., short- or long-term contracts, or "spot" sales; (2) the frequency
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Nonetheless, in comparison with acquisitions of fringe firms (and de novo
entry), the effect of the acquisition of a "core firm" would be pronounced
and immediate. Hence, in assessing "core firm" acquisitions vis-A-vis "fringe
firm" acquisitions, the anticipated public benefits stemming from "fringe
firm" acquisitions should be more heavily discounted.4 1
Fringe Firms
Is de novo entry by financial congenerics into related markets socially
preferable to entry by acquisitions of "fringe firms" - firms without in-
dividual effect on the nature and forms of rivalry in a market due to small
relative size42 or lethargy?43 It might be argued that acquisitions of "fringe
firms" also necessitate a positive defense if the often empirically precarious
assumptions are granted that all acquisitions eliminate a competitor, actual
or potential - however remote - and that acquisitions are initially void of
the salutary effect of increasing aggregate industry capacity.
By definition, acquisitions of "fringe firms" per se would not have a
deleterious effect upon the rivalry within, and performance of the market(s)
involved. The crucial policy question therefore is the desirability of ac-
quisitions of "fringe firms" relative to de novo entry, say, at a comparable
scale.44 Again, by definition, if de novo entry is on a "fringe firm" scale,
of purchase, e.g., repetitive or one-time purchases; (8) the nature and extent of crucial
non-price variables; (4) the importance of specialized labor inputs and the time required
to train or pirate such personnel; and (5) the (closely interrelated) degree to which
capital goods such as computers can augment, or be substituted for, specialized personnel.
A knowledgeable student of the industry with concerted study and analysis, of course,
could probably derive some well reasoned estimates as to the time involved. Of necessity,
such estimates would depend upon the analytical framework employed and the buttressing
data utilized, drawn both from the particular industry's history directly and from the
experiences by analogy.
41 One objective of discounting might be to choose the market changes providing the
greatest present social value of the benefits, a procedure dependent upon a confident
forecast of the future. A more compelling rationale for discounting is found in the
circumstances engendering the financial congeneric movement. As noted earlier, the
environment in which banks operate (in part, the related, competitive markets -financial
and otherwise) has been changing rapidly over the past few years and one can expect this
change to continue and if anything, at an accelerated rate. It is surely not an enlightened
public policy that opts for future benefits in markets that may have atrophied by the
time that "future" arrives.
42 It is not possible to specify a priori the maximum relative size of a "fringe firm."
The maximum relative size would depend upon, inter alia, demand elasticity and flex-
ibility of the scale of production (individually and collectively) of firms in the industry;
thus, the maximum relative size of a "Fringe Firm" is small where demand is more
inelastic, and production becomes more inflexible.
43 This, of course, is not to say that "fringe firms" collectively do not affect rivalry
within, and performance of a market. See Arant, Competition of the Few Among the
Many, 70 Q.J. ECON. 327 (1956); Wellisz, The Coexistence of Large and Small Firms: A
Study of the Italian Mechanical Industries, 71 Q.J. EcoN. 116 (1957).
441t is sometimes contended that merging firms bear, or should bear, the burden of
proof in demonstrating that a proposed acquisition has net socially beneficial results.
However, even the most zealous "trust-busters," who tend to presume all acquisitions
undesirable until demonstrated otherwise, ignore- due to priorities, a lack of resources,
and perhaps a lack of judicial standing- "trivial" cases. Accordingly, I also dismiss this
contention as being of little pragmatic concern.
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it would not have an immediate impact upon rivalry within, and per-
formance of the market. The issue a fortiori turns on the time-path of, and
possible ultimate differences in, the influence of the different methods of
entry upon the rivalry within, and performance of the markets involved.
Entry into, and growth within new markets- whether by established
or de novo organization -inevitably involves pecuniary and temporal
"start-up" costs. The possible private pecuniary advantages, if any, of entry
by acquisition are largely, if not totally, irrelevant socially.45 However, where
highly specialized and experienced labor, other limited specialized resources,
fixed licenses and so forth are absolutely mandatory for entry, acquisition
may be the only route by which the composition of firms within an industry
can be modified (i.e., the private pecuniary costs of de novo entry are
"infinite"). The principal social advantage of entry by acquisition in most
cases would be from the diminution in temporal "start-up" costs. The extent
of the reduction in lags would depend upon the characteristics of the in-
dustries and firms involved, with the relevant factors including, inter alia,
the extent to which required resources can be transferred from established
operations, the lead-times for training or manufacture of specialized re-
sources, the difficulties in obtaining licenses (if necessary and available),
and the nature of any specialized promotional and marketing problems.
Further, in almost all cases, de novo entry would involve an appreciably
longer "shake-down" period than would be true of entry by acquisition.
In many cases, the time required for financial congenerics to enter
related markets de novo will be markedly greater than that for entry by
acquisition, and in some cases de novo entry may be absolutely blockaded.
To be sure, the time required for de novo entry by financial congenerics
perforce would be less than for many other potential entrants. However,
the pecuniary and temporal costs of ultimately achieving a market position
of influence on rivalry within, and performance of, a market are crucial,
unlike those of entry on an irrelevant "fringe firm" scale.
Any diminution in time required for entry on a "fringe firm" scale
permits pari passu a comparable diminution in time required to achieve a
market position of influence on rivalry and performance. Moreover, finan-
cial congenerics, as relatively large established organizations, can transfer
already controlled, or acquire (often more readily) resources required for
expansion. Indeed, it is likely that the comparative advantage of financial
congenerics will often be, depending upon the industry and organization
involved, in expansion of scale rather than in entry per se.
Even though all firms within an industry would qualify as "fringe
45 It should be recognized that the private pecuniary advantages of entry by acquisi-
tion (where the entering firm's financial resources are limited and capital markets are
less than perfect) may permit, for example, modifications in behavior of and expansion
of scale by the acquired firm. While social benefits would stem from private advantages
in this event, the argument is neither necessary nor sufficient to establish the desirability
of an acquisition, except perhaps in exceptional cases.
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firms" (an industry similar to, though not necessarily equivalent to the
"competitive" industry of economic theory), the optimum scale for a finan-
cial congeneric may be larger than that of independent "fringe firms." In
such cases, the initial effects of financial congenerics' acquisitions would
be limited to those stemming from advantages of integration. These ad-
vantages may stem from economies of scale or joint production in a stage of
production in an activity common to both industries. 46
If the financial congenerics' optimum scale of operations is drastically
larger than that of independent "fringe firms," it is conceivable that entry
into that market by financial congenerics would lead to a break-down in the
prevailing market structure, leading perhaps to an "oligopoly" or "monop-
oly." 47 In this event, the anomalous result is a price determined in an
1oligopolistic" or "monopolistic" market that is lower than the initial "com-
petitive" price, with the latter serving as an upper limit on the former. For
a contrary result, it is necessary that barriers to entry be raised for firms that
might potentially enter as the independents initially operated. 48 Such bar-
riers to entry, resulting from the change in market structure or from the
nature of rivalry, that develop within the market might be, so it is implied,
a denial of credit, product differentiation, or full-lime forcing. None of the
latter possibilities, despite their polemical merits, approach the plausible.
For them to prevail, unlawful collusion aside, it would be necessary (a) that
all credit suppliers were operating subsidiaries in the instant industry, (b)
which necessarily denies the required level of product differentiation, and
(c) that the dearly held and vigorously enforced prohibitions against full-
lime forcing be discarded as dead letters.
CONCLUSIONS
The proper stance for "antitrust"-type policy towards financial con-
generics can be best labeled "sympathetic," in contrast to either "permis-
sive" or "restrictive." The social costs of a permissive policy towards "dom-
inant firm" acquisitions in some (but not necessarily all or even most) cases
may be substantial, and the remedial problems encountered in such cases
may be insurmountable. A restrictive policy towards "core firm" and "fringe
firm" acquisitions most frequently would substantially delay if not deny the
46 While equilibrium in a competitive market requires increasing costs to the firm,
this does not preclude unexploited economies of scale in one of many stages of production,
i.e., increasing costs for the firm may reflect indivisibilities or decreasing returns to scale
in only one or a few of many vertically or laterally related stages of production.
47 This result depends upon a shift in scale, not merely a reduction in the level of
costs. To be sure, if costs are merely lower through some range of output without a con-
comitant drastic shift in the optimum scale of operations (at prevailing product and
factor prices), the financial congenerics entering the market would realize profits analogous
to "rent" in economic theory. However, this would not dictate the above changes in
market structure.
48 It is irrelevant that such potential entrants would suffer cost disadvantages vis-A-vis
financial congenerics, i.e., that they realize only a competitive rate of return whereas the
financial congenerics realize a higher return.
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salutary effects of rivalry from firms with different behavioral motivations
and the resources to influence market rivalry and performance by acting
upon those motivations. It is not possible to defend, as a basis for decisions
to permit or forestall particular acquisitions, per se rules based on specific
market shares of acquired and acquiring firms, and thereby ignore the
nature of rivalry within the affected markets and the impact of the ac.
quisition upon rivalry and social performance.
